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Essay
Supreme Court Opinions-Style and
Substance: An Appeal for Reform
by
RAY FORRESTER*
I am pleased that you have noticed my efforts to produce opinions
which are clear, succinct and without footnotes, where possible.
Opinion writing is something which leaves room for different styles,
and I have no illusions that my approach will be widely copied. Nev-
ertheless, in my view we write for a rather wide "audience" here at
the Supreme Court, and clarity and simplicity can be virtues.
Letter from Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, United States Supreme
Court, to Ray Forrester, Professor, Hastings College of the Law (May
11, 1988) (on file with author).
Fred Rodell Renewed
More than half a century ago, Fred Rodell, of the Yale law
faculty, reviewed the flaws in American legal writing. He said it was
lacking in two respects: one style, the other content. Fred Rodell,
Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 Va. L. Rev. 38 (1936).
There was enthusiastic and widespread agreement from many
readers. The article became famous. But when the subject was ad-
dressed again by Rodell, he announced that "[a] quarter century has
wrought no revolution ..... Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews-
Revisited, 48 Va. L. Rev. 279, 286 (1962).
Now, decades after Rodell's latest appraisal, the weaknesses of
legal writing have become increasingly obvious and, more impor-
tantly, have spread to the most influential example of American legal
expression-the opinions of the United States Supreme Court.
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. A.B.
1933, University of Arkansas; J.D. 1936, University of Chicago; LL.D. 1992, Tlane Uni-
versity. At the author's reasoned request, the citations in this Essay appear in the main text
rather than in footnotes, and therefore do not conform to the Bluebook
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Even so, some relief is signaled by the enlightened example set by
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor in her opinions, in varying respects fol-
lowed, it appears, by some of the other more recent appointees to the
Court.
The Power of the Court and Its Source
The power assumed by our Supreme Court is unique among gov-
ernments. Article III of the Constitution says that "[t]he judicial
power shall extend to all cases ... arising under this Constitution....
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
But the Constitution does not say who shall have the final say as
to what is "this Constitution." By their ambiguous language, the writ-
ers of the Constitution left unsettled this critical question. It is possi-
ble they did this intentionally to avoid an issue that might have caused
some states to refuse to ratify the new form of government. The issue
and its significance were well known. The judiciary in some states had
already claimed interpretive power under state constitutions. But the
national resolution of the issue was left open for future determination.
Though the new government and its Supreme Court were estab-
lished in 1789, it was not until 1803 that an answer was officially as-
serted in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). John
Marshall, the fourth Chief Justice, writing for a unanimous Court, as-
serted "that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by [the
Constitution]" and that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what [the Constitution] is." Id. at 177.
Despite the disagreement of President Thomas Jefferson and
many members of the Congress, this bold assertion by John Marshall
has survived as the final and official answer.
This would pose no problem if the Constitution were clear. But,
in fact, many of the most important words and clauses of the Constitu-
tion are highly ambiguous, as amply illustrated by the "arising under"
words of Article III itself. But that is true also of the Due Process
Clauses, the Equal Protection provision, the Privileges or Immunities
Clauses, and the provision prohibiting "unreasonable searches and
seizures." There are many other such vague and open words and
clauses.
All of these "laws" have one thing in common-they are com-
posed of words that lend themselves to more than one meaning. They
are obscure and indeterminate. They invite and, in fact, require inter-
pretation. To decide new cases on the basis of ambiguous words, some
division of government can, indeed, must fill the void.
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The necessity and power of interpretation is not a recent discov-
ery. In Bishop Hoadly's sermon, preached before the King in 1717, he
said:
[W]hoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or
spoken laws, it is he who is truly the lawgiver, to all intents and
purposes, and not the persons who first spoke or wrote them.
John Chipman Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law 125 (2d ed.
1921) (quoting Bishop Hoadly's sermon before the King on Mar. 31,
1717). Truer words were never spoken and Chief Justice Marshall was
well aware of that in 1803. Yet, he never acknowledged this factor in
his bold assertion in Marbury!
It was Aaron Burr-a contemporary of Marshall-who observed:
"Law is whatever is boldly asserted and plausibly maintained." Ameri-
can Quotations 326 (Gorton Carruth & Eugene Ehrlic eds., 1994).
And when Alice asked how one can make words mean so many differ-
ent things, it was Humpty Dumpty who replied, "[t]he question is
which is to be master-that's all." Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking
Glass, in The Complete Works of Lewis Carroll 214 (Vintage Books
1976) (1872). Marshall, at one stroke, proved Hoadly, Burr and
Humpty Dumpty to be correct.
A most important and revealing example of this is the interpreta-
tion by the Supreme Court of the "due process" clauses of the Consti-
tution. The Fifth Amendment, adopted in 1791, provides that no
person shall be deprived by the federal government "of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law...." U.S. Const. amend. V. The
Fourteenth Amendment, adopted in 1868, provides that no person
shall be deprived by a state "of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.... ." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
Historically, scholars agree, the "due process" words related only to
procedure, that is, to the process or procedure that is due. See William
B. Lockhart et al., Contitutional Law 340-41 (7th ed. 1991). But in
1890, for the first time, the Supreme Court asserted-again boldly-
that the words "due process of law" also covered the substance-as
well as the procedures-of laws. Thus, the phrase came to mean due
substance and process of law. See Chicago, Minneapolis & St. Paul Ry.
v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
In time, the Court's key test of whether the substance of a law
violated the due process clause was the "reasonableness" of the law.
Justice Black expressed this result plainly in his concurring opinion in
Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline, 315 U.S. 575 (1942):
Under those views, first embodied in a holding of this Court in 1890,
"due process" means no less than "reasonableness judicially deter-
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mined." In accordance with this elastic meaning which, in the words
of Mr. Justice Holmes, makes the sky the limit of judicial power to
declare legislative acts unconstitutional, the conclusions of judges,
substituted for those of legislatures, become a broad and varying
standard of constitutionality.
Id. at 600. Much of American constitutional law is presently based on
this questionable interpretation by the Supreme Court of the words
"due process" in the 14th and 5th Amendments.
The application of most of the Bill of Rights to the States is
founded on this misinterpretation. In fact, a mountain of federal
power, mainly in the Supreme Court but also in the Congress, is based
on this questionable foundation. Many, many words have been written
and even more spoken on the standard of interpretation that should
govern Supreme Court justices in the exercise of their nearly limitless
power.
There is constant debate, often involving terms that only the
speaker presumes to understand, about which theory or standard the
Supreme Court should obey in reaching decisions and in attempting to
justify them in the Court's written opinions. The so-called "interpre-
tivists" and the "noninterpretivists" fight constant, bitter, though thus
far bloodless, academic battles on the college platforms, in the books,
and in the law reviews. Catch phrases may be heard from time to time
rising above the din of verbal strife. The "living constitution" is one of
the verbal weapons most frequently employed.
Largely ignored are the rules laid down by James Madison:
An interpretation that destroys the very characteristic of the
Government cannot be just.
Where a meaning is clear, the consequences, whatever they
may be, are to be admitted-where doubtful, it is fairly triable by its
consequences.
In controverted cases, the meaning of the parties to the instru-
ment, if to be collected by reasonable evidence, is a proper guide.
Contemporary and concurrent expositions are a reasonable evi-
dence of the meanings of the parties.
In admitting or rejecting a constructive authority, not only the
degree of its incidentality to an express authority is to be regarded,
but the degree of its importance also; since on this will depend the
probability or improbability of its being left to construction. In Con-
gress, 2 February 1791.
6 Writings of Madison 19 (G. Hunt ed., 1906).
Initially, John Marshall and company asserted judicial power sim-
ply to nullify or veto a law found in violation of the Constitution as
they interpreted it. In effect, this permitted the legislature to enact a
new law to replace the defective one. But as time went by the Court
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extended the power to include affirmative lawmaking itself, after void-
ing an act of the legislature as unconstitutional.
A familiar example, among many, is Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966). The majority opinion was written by Chief Justice Warren.
In his dissent, Harlan described the result as "the Court's new consti-
tutional code of rules for confessions." Id. at 504. White, also dissent-
ing to the majority opinion, said: "[W]hat it has done is to make new
law and new public policy in much the same way that it has in the
course of interpreting other great clauses of the Constitution." Id. at
531.
. James Madison, that early American genius, often referred to as
the "Father of the Constitution," explained the matter plainly and ad-
equately in The Federalist No. 37.
All new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill, and
passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered
as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liqui-
dated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adju-
dications. Besides the obscurity arising from the complexity of
objects and the imperfection of the human faculties, the medium
through which the conceptions of men are conveyed to each other
adds a fresh embarrassment. The use of words is to express ideas.
Perspicuity therefore requires, not only that the ideas should be dis-
tinctly formed, but that they should be expressed by words distinctly
and exclusively appropriated to them. But no language is so copious
as to supply words and phrases for every complex idea, or so correct
as not to include many, equivocally denoting different ideas. Hence
it must happen, that however accurately objects may be discrimi-
nated in themselves, and however accurately the discrimination may
be conceived, the definition of them may be rendered inaccurate, by
the inaccuracy of the terms in which it is delivered. And this una-
voidable inaccuracy must be greater or less, according to the com-
plexity and novelty of the objects defined. When the Almighty
himself condescends to address mankind in their own language, his
meaning, luminous as it must be, is rendered dim and doubtful, by
the cloudy medium through which it is communicated.
Here, then, are three sources of vague and incorrect defini-
tions; indistinctness of the object, imperfection of the organ of per-
ception, inadequateness of the vehicle of ideas. Any one of these
must produce a certain degree of obscurity. The convention, in de-
lineating the boundary between the federal and State jurisdictions,
must have experienced the full effect of them all.
The Federalist No. 37, at 287-88 (James Madison) (John C. Hamilton
ed., 1904). Thus, constitutions are composed of words, and words are
inherently imprecise and inadequate, some more than others.
November 1995]
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The use of new words to explain the meaning of the original
words suffers with the same defect. In fact, they often aggravate the
problem.
The reality is that whoever has the power to apply words is forced
to fill in the open frame of ambiguity with specific applications to new
and often unanticipated problems. It is as if an artist were given a
frame containing a blank canvas. The artist is compelled to fill in the
details. But in the case of words (laws), the picture is inevitably im-
pressionistic, requiring continued efforts at specificity to fit each new
and novel case. And incidentally, since no two cases are identical, the
judge must create new meaning (law) in deciding each case.
This gives credence to John Chipman Gray's remarkable theory
that all law is judge-made because the law of the particular case is not
determined until the ambiguity of the words (the law) is resolved by
the judge in the final and individual interpretation and application of
the words to the always novel facts of the exact new case.
So the monumental debate concerning theories of interpretation
largely overlooks the fact that the judge not only can but must make
the choice about the meaning to be given to words that literally have
no meaning as to new and novel facts. Indeed, the facts themselves
can be hopelessly ambiguous as Madison also explains. The ambiguity
of words not only invites free use of judicial power, it compels it.
Justice White suggests this in his opinion in Miranda when he
adds to his recognition that the Court makes "new law" the declara-
tion that "[t]his is what the Court historically has done. Indeed, it is
what it must do. . . until and unless there is some fundamental change
in the constitutional distribution of governmental powers." Miranda,
384 U.S. at 531.
Of course, the individual justice can adopt a personal standard as
to how and when to make new law within the vacuum of indecisive
words. The justice can follow, by analogy, the law previously made by
predecessors. But this also leaves the justice relatively unguided be-
cause the previous law was applied to different facts, both within the
case itself, and within the contemporary circumstances and needs of
society.
Or the justice can follow personal conscience, judgment, and
sense of values, though this is customarily done without admitting it.
Here, the "living constitution" is frequently invoked as if it were some
objective and clear set of standards existing in a not yet discovered
source.
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Honesty and understanding would be greatly advanced if the jus-
tices frankly admitted their freedom of choice and based their judg-
ments on a recitation and appraisal of the actual merits of each case
free and clear of the obvious and somewhat fraudulent fiction that
they have found or discovered the law in that mysterious and con-
stantly changing "living constitution." It is time that the justices come
clean with the American people and frankly admit that the "living
constitution" is, in fact, the "living justices." It is in reality the compos-
ite of the lives, the consciences, the personal values, and the sense of
self-restraint in the use of power of nine "living humans."
The Function of Judicial Opinions
It is because Supreme Court justices have come to possess this
vast and ultimately unrestrained power over the people and the gov-
ernment that judicial opinions are so important and so necessary.
Under the American version of the Rule of Law, judicial opinions
serve the function of explaining and justifying the exercise of power
case by case. Within our system of judicial supremacy, written opin-
ions become the judicial concession to democracy-to the exercise of
elitist power over a mass of consenting subjects.
The theory is, or should be, that by explaining and-attempting to
justify decrees imposed on the majority, the Court and "its Constitu-
tion" gain the tacit approval and obedience of the governed.
Judicial opinions also serve the function of setting up "helpful
guide posts" for proper future compliance by lawyers, other judges,
present and future, and, most importantly, the people in general.
Thus, the opinions should be written for a very wide audience, for
people in general of varying levels of education and intelligence. But
how are they written? Who is the actual audience and what is the level
of communication?
The Present Style and Quality of Supreme Court Opinions
The Language
Today, most Supreme Court opinions are incomprehensible to
the general public.
This is due, in large measure, to the language that is used. Legal
words and phrases, unfamiliar to the general public, are consistently
employed. That is the prevailing and long-standing style. Rather than
tell Widow Brown respecting her interest in the old homestead,
"Madam, you own it all," we impress and mystify her with the infor-
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mation that she possesses a "fee simple" title-words incomprehensi-
ble to her but suggesting something highly technical and mysterious,
understood only by trained legal professionals.
The artifice is even more impressive if couched in Latin. Justices
love to wrap their decrees in Latin-a language with which most are
not familiar, though they pick up a few phrases in law school-res ipsa
loquitur, pro se, habeas corpus, corum nobis, certiorari, mandamus,
quo warranto, nunc pro tunc, sine die, and on and on. Most legal
terms, including those in Latin, refer to simple things and concepts
which can be described by the use of plain words and phrases under-
stood by the people in general.
Why do we use this mumbo jumbo, this barrier between the law-
yer and the public? It is the cult of the priesthood, whether it be in
religion, law, medicine, science or finance. Professionals, in general,
wrap their communications in synonyms that have the effect of sepa-
rating the expert from the general population. Only the members of
the priesthood understand and can communicate with each other.
Each new profession inevitably develops this shield which prevents
the layperson from understanding the members of the profession. A
recent example is the computer. People with computers now talk in
their own unknown tongue. Physicians glory in the use of highly in-
volved multisyllabic Latin, nearly unpronounceable without much
practice, to describe the most simple physical ills and objects well
known to all. The ploy is employed by many, including plumbers and
automobile mechanics. The practical effect of the device is to establish
a monopoly, based on lack of communication between the priests and
the masses.
There is no good reason why justices cannot write their opinions
in simple words that the people in general can understand, rather than
in the customary legalese. And they should do so if they really want to
foster a democratic Rule of Law in which those in power explain and
justify their orders calling for peaceful obedience.
For Supreme Court justices particularly, there is a duty to seek
the most simple words for use in their opinions. What is to be gained
by obfuscation? Or, to use a more simple word, obscurity?
Though the writer has been reading judicial opinions for many
years, it is not unusual to come across a word or phrase in a Supreme
Court opinion that requires the time-consuming task of using Webster
or the legal dictionary to determine the meaning. Why not use the
simple words of Webster in the first place?
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Such legal ostentation should be abandoned. Simple and plain
words that are clear to one and all should be sought. This is a good
rule for lawyers in general to follow even in writing briefs for appel-
late judges. The message is much more likely to come across smoothly
and effectively.
The Length
While lack of simplicity in the choice of words is a major fault of
present Supreme Court opinions, length is of comparable importance.
Many opinions are composed of a flood of words. The sheer volume
constitutes a verbal curtain to communication even to the professional
readers, such as professors of constitutional law.
Though the original Supreme Court justices often used Latin
phrases, reflecting even in those early days the mystique of the priest-
hood, the opinions were brief and to the point. The model they fol-
lowed was that of the English appellate judges who customarily
decided their cases without delay and with short and sharp style.
In early years, the justices at times wrote individual opinions in
each case (called seriatim opinions) and then counted to determine
the majority result. This device, which helpfully revealed the different
attitudes of the members of the Court, still consumed relatively little
verbiage because the justices expressed themselves with brevity in the
English style.
And the opinion of John Marshall in the most famous case of all,
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), consumed less
than twenty-eight pages of of the official reporter. The opinions in
other cases often filled less than three pages. E.g., United States v.
Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801).
An exception is the case of Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
419 (1793), in which the seriatim opinions consumed almost fifty-two
pages of the official reporter. But that case was of "uncommon magni-
tude." Id. at 453. It provoked the adoption of the Eleventh
Amendment.
But with exceptions, the early style of the justices was brief and
often informal, except for the addiction to Latin-an ancient heritage.
John Marshall, regarded by many as our greatest justice, and cer-
tainly the voice of the Court in establishing judicial supremacy in Mar-
bury, adopted a practice in opinion-writing that gave him unusual
personal power.
For many years, particularly in the early years before President
Jefferson's appointees joined the Court, John Marshall wrote a major
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portion of the Court's opinions. Marshall adopted a style for which
there is much to be said. First, he was able to gain unanimity, particu-
larly in the years when the Federalists held the presidency. This per-
mitted the Court to present its pronouncements with singular force.
Second, the Court spoke with one voice, John Marshall's, which gave
consistency and unity to the language and the theory of the law. Third,
Marshall presented a strong and clear conception of the desired struc-
ture of government.
Even the renowned Joseph Story, famed as a constitutional
scholar, generally sat by as Marshall spoke singularly for the Court. In
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), however,
when Marshall excused himself because of personal involvement
(something he might well have done in Marbury), Story wrote the
opinion.
Marshall became the architect of the new federal system and of
the separation of powers. His colleagues granted him the power to
paint in the details of the blank canvas-a power based on the "ob-
scure and equivocal" words of the new Constitution. The Federalist
No. 37, at 287 (James Madison) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1904).
Compare the force of Marshall's style of opinion-writing with the
earlier seriatim opinions of the first Supreme Court or with the many
discordant and sometimes angry voices of the present Court. Compare
the impact on the reader of the gifted advocacy of Marshall in Mar-
bury with the discordant nine voices of the Court today. Would we
have the strong basic frame of the constitutional system we now enjoy
without the single-minded voice of John Marshall speaking for all
members of the Court?
Not only are many conflicting and confusing voices heard today,
but they are found in opinions of excessive length.
Perhaps the case of greatest length in the history of the Court is
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). The discussion involves the consti-
tutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974, wherein
Congress undertook to reform the financing of federal election cam-
paigns, a subject of vital national importance. Using the First Amend-
ment, the majority of the Court held unconstitutional the limitation of
independent political spending while holding constitutional similar
limits on spending in the form of direct contributions to candidates.
The result is questionable from the standpoint of First Amendment
legal theory and even more from a practical point of view. It stands as
a major obstacle to effective reform of the scandalous system of elec-
tion financing that now exists. The several opinions in the case cover
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one hundred and ninety-seven pages of the official reporter (and close
to three hundred pages with the appendix). The Per Curiam Opinion
of the majority covered one hundred and thirty-nine pages (two hun-
dred and thirty with the appendix).
Woodward and Armstrong in The Brethren reported that the Per
Curiam Opinion was put together by a committee of the Justices, with
different sections assigned to individual justices. Bob Woodward &
Scott Armstrong, The Brethren: Inside the Supreme Court 396 (1979).
A reading of the Opinion certainly adds credence to this claim. The
Opinion does cover a complex and lengthy statute and therefore its
verbosity can be justified to some extent.
But the practical result of such long and involved opinions is that
few people are likely to read them. Only constitutional law professors
and others directly responsible for understanding the work of the
Supreme Court are likely to read the full report.
Yet the decision affects all the people of the United States in a
most fundamental way and reaches a result that is not adequately jus-
tified or explained. The practical result of the verbosity and sheer bulk
of the opinions is to erect a heavy curtain of words between an unfor-
tunate decision and the public awareness and understanding of what is
going on. Even professional journalists have evidently not found the
time or the ability to diagnose and pass along to the public the consti-
tutional barrier to political reform that this case has erected.
Unfortunately, bad decisions seem to coincide all too often with
opinions of excessive length. For example, the several opinions pub-
lished in the case of Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393
(1857), which spoke of human slaves as property, covered nearly two
hundred and thirty-five pages.
Then as now such length has the practical effect, even if not in-
tended, of removing the opinions from the scrutiny of the governed.
The excessive length has the effect of anesthetizing the reader. The
needless verbosity not only serves to confuse the reader, it also makes
the task too time-consuming.
The problem applies not only to cases with lengthy majority opin-
ions but also to cases in which many members of the Court feel com-
pelled to write additional opinions, whether in dissent or concurrence,
or a combination.
The present Court has a strong and growing practice of writing
additional opinions in which the majority or plurality opinion is dis-
cussed in sections, often designated by Roman numerals. This invites
the writer to concur on one section and dissent on another. When sev-
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eral justices do this, which is often the case now, the reader, who is
trying to understand the majority results, is forced to count heads sec-
tion by section.
A recent example is Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
Two "opinions of the court" are reported-one by Justice White and
the other by Chief Justice Rehnquist. The syllabus to the case, pre-
pared by the Reporter of Decisions and published with the opinions of
the justices, reads as follows:
WHITE, J., delivered an opinion, Parts I, II, and IV of which are for
the Court, and filed a dissenting opinion in Part III. MARSHALL,
BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined Parts I, II, III, and IV of
that opinion; SCALIA, J., joined Parts I and II; and KENNEDY, J.,joined Parts I and IV. REHNQUIST, C.J., delivered an opinion,
Part II of which is for the Court, and filed a dissenting opinion in
Parts I and III, post, p. 1266. O'CONNOR, J., joined Parts I, II, and
III of that opinion; KENNEDY and SOUTER, JJ., joined Parts I
and II; and SCALIA, J., joined Parts II and III. KENNEDY, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 1266.
Id. at 279. In effect, the opinion of the Court is split between two
justices with idiosyncratic (forgive the word) ruminations (forgive this
one, too) on the part of the other members of the Court.
This judicial chewing of the cud is an increasing phenomenon
which plainly aggravates the traditional problem of lawyer-like prolix-
ity (wordiness).
It is a regression to the seriatim opinion in a particularly aggravat-
ing fashion.
The Court has become the "Supreme Debating Society."
Compare this style with that of John Marshall (or even of Earl
Warren in the Brown v. Board of Education). Marshall managed to
become the spokesman of the Court. His was the single voice, the
single vocabulary, the unique form and substance. This was particu-
larly true in his early days as Chief Justice when the constitutional
foundations of the nation were constructed. He was largely the archi-
tect and the builder. Even with the capable constitutional scholar, Jus-
tice Story, at his side, he presented his logic, in his language, with his
results.
How did this happen? Perhaps his colleagues were willing to let
him do the hard work of opinion-writing as long as they were allowed
to exert their influences in the final decisions.
But how fortunate it was to have one constitution, created in its
detail, by one talented writer.
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This probably was possible only because Marshall must have
hammered out a consensus within the Court. Undoubtedly, this re-
quired group discussion, negotiation and compromise. Until Jefferson
appointed William Johnson in 1804, all the justices were Federalist ap-
pointees, with considerable like-mindedness.
This must have been a major factor in Marshall's favor. William
Johnson, Jefferson's first appointee in 1804, lost little time in expres-
sing his contrary point of view in separate opinions, though even he
seemed to accept the Marshall monopoly and the consensus approach
in most cases.
Why not return to Marshall's style? Why shouldn't the present
Court work out a consensus, case by case, and speak again with one
voice? The one voice might be only that of the Chief Justice or, in
rotation, that of one Justice at a time.
Is this impossible? No. The Congress, composed of more than
five hundred members, always does it in the final enactment of a stat-
ute. Obviously, it is an amalgamation of many different concurring
and dissenting voices, but when the job is done, when all the discus-
sion, negotiation, and compromise are completed, there is one law,
one set of words by which we are governed.
Supreme Court opinions are laws, too, even more important in
many instances than statutes because the Court's opinions often "con-
stitutionalize" the law. That is, the judge-made constitutional law can-
not be amended or modified except by a constitutional amendment
which requires an overpowering majority of popular opinion, or a
change in the majority will of the Court.
If the present Court adopted the Marshall method of working out
a compromise, as the legislature does, before announcing its new law
with one voice, the law would become more clear, more succinct,
more verbally and logically consistent, and more predictable. This
would increase public understanding and acceptance of the Court's
vast power and it would fortify the all-important Rule of Law.
At times in recent years, the Supreme Court has announced a
decision in a form similar to a legislative enactment. An example is
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (the Penta-
gon Papers case). The full Per Curiam Opinion of the Court filled less
than one page.
The rules of law were announced in one paragraph as follows:
"Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court
bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity."
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); see also Near
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v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S., 697 (1931). The Government
"thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposi-
tion of such a restraint." Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe,
402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971). The District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York in the New York Times case and the District
Court for the District of Columbia and the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit in the Washington Post case held that
the Government had not met that burden. We agree.
Id. at 714. The refreshing brevity and clarity of this Opinion is similar
to a statute.
In the Pentagon Papers case, this majority consensus is followed
by a seriatim opinion by each member of the Court. Thus, we have a
remarkable decision in which there are ten opinions, the Per Curiam
plus nine individual opinions by each justice. The total result, of
course, is substantial verbosity plus an invitation, if not a necessity, for
renewed head counting.
However, one may argue that the individual opinions do promote
predictability. Thus, it is possible that the case may present a new
model by offering, first, a single expression of the law, and second, an
indication of the attitude of each justice, to be used in predicting indi-
vidual votes in future analogous cases.
The result, therefore, is similar to the legislative model of law-
making because the single, consensus expression of the law in a stat-
ute is accompanied by a published legislative history of debates and
committee proceedings that reveal individual viewpoints of interested
legislators.
Except for its total verbosity, the Pentagon Papers example may
be worthy of consideration as the style of the future.
Should Justices Write the Opinions?
Justices have on occasion stated that the law clerks draft their
opinions and the individual justices edit them.
Initially, it seems clear the first justices wrote their opinions. Usu-
ally the opinions were brief and simple. Further, a single vocabulary
and set of legal standards and personal values were reflected in the
opinions.
Most of the justices now use four clerks, with new ones coming in
about each year-not long after law school. They are likely to reflect
the varying words, theories, and values of their constitutional law
professors. This may have something to do with the inconsistencies we
observe in the finished opinions, especially if a justice is newly ap-
pointed, with little background in constitutional law. The use of clerks'
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drafts may also contribute to the undue length of many opinions and
to the fractured and somewhat unpredictable viewpoints that one now
finds in the splintered treatment given to some cases. See Paul M. Bar-
rett, There Is Blood on an Opinion, We Know Who Wrote It: The
Supreme Court Justices (and Their Clerks) Stamp Prose with Quirky
Flair, Wall St. J., Oct. 4, 1994, at Al.
Perhaps it is impractical for the justices today to initially draft all
of their opinions. Selective drafting of particular cases may be neces-
sary. But is it likely that opinions written by the justices themselves
would be more brief, more clear, more consistent, and less encrusted
with footnotes and unnecessary materials?
Judicial Ipse Dixits
Not only do Supreme Court opinions suffer from excessive
length, at times they go to the opposite extreme. Brevity rather than
tedious long-windedness separates the reader from what is sometimes
judicial overreaching. There are several remarkable examples of this
in the history of the Court.
In Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886),
at the very beginning of the official report, this appears:
Before argument Mr. Chief Justice Waite said: The court does not
wish to hear argument on the question whether the provision in the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State
to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of the opinion
that it does.
Id. at 396. This crisp ipse dixit establishes a legal principle of historic
proportions. In this rare fashion, the Chief Justice declares that the
word "person" in the Fourteenth Amendment includes corporations.
The Court refuses to hear argument, yet announces this unani-
mous conclusion without giving any precedent, reasons or explana-
tions. In one sentence the federal protections of the Fourteenth
Amendment are extended to corporations under the watchful control
of a then friendly federal Supreme Court.
Another example of exquisite relief for the tired reader of long
Supreme Court opinions is to be found in Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652 (1925). Justice Sanford propounds another ipse dixit of vast
consequence when he announces:
For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech
and of the press-which are protected by the First Amendment
from abridgment by Congress-are among the fundamental per-
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sonal rights and "liberties" protected by the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.
Id. at 666. In the face of such examples, one must confess reluctantly
that it is possible for judicial conclusions to be too brief.
Again, John Marshall's opinions gave us the model of a happy
medium between the long and the short of it. Marbury, the most im-
portant of all cases, covers only nine pages of the Supreme Court
Reports.
The Supreme Court of today, however, offers hope of relief. Jus-
tice O'Connor is noteworthy for her conservation of paper and ink in
most of her opinions. The same must be said, usually, for Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter. O'Connor, particularly, is writing for a
wider audience. Clarity and brevity are her hallmarks.
Judicial Advocacy
Supreme Court opinions in recent years increasingly have be-
come exercises in individual argumentation and advocacy on the part
of the several justices.
The Court has given new meaning to the word "opinion." More
and more justices reveal their commitment to individual values and
personal preferences. The constant reader begins to perceive the sub-
jective commitments of the nine individuals to their own personal val-
ues. Sometimes these values are perceived slowly and vaguely as a
reader goes over the many opinions of a justice. Other times, they
stand out starkly. One example has been the constant repetition by
Justices Brennan and Marshall of their categorical opposition to capi-
tal punishment. In effect they declared in many dissenting opinions
that they would make no exception to their opposition regardless of
the unknown facts and circumstances of future cases. They announced
how oncoming cases would be decided by them before briefs, argu-
ments or consideration of future circumstances.
Not only do the justices occasionally reveal value judgments
seemingly cast in stone, but they also use their opinions to advocate
pragmatic results based less on prior decisions and "the law" than on
the personal philosophy and political orientation of the justice. At
times the behavior takes on the aspects of a campaign. Can one be the
umpire and play first base at the same time?
One sees this in the highly predictable conclusions of some jus-
tices in certain types of cases.
Indeed, if one describes the particular facts of a pending case to
an experienced constitutional law professor, the odds are good that he
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or she can tell you how some justices will vote without doing any re-
search on the fine points of the law upon which such decisions are
supposedly made.
Thus, predictability (Le., legal advice) turns not on the law or
logic of the case but more on the values and policy orientation of
some justices. In reality, there is no escape from this. We are all bound
by our basic values and ways of thinking established over the years in
our environments.
Yet, to read the individual opinions, one is led to believe that the
ultimate ruling is based on "the law" which the opinion writer seem-
ingly "discovers." All too often the "discovery" is remarkably consis-
tent with the justice's long-standing predilections.
Again, we find a good example in the remarkable Miranda case,
another long case of about one hundred pages. Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966). Chief Justice Warren announced a new "min-
icode" of criminal procedure on custodial police interrogation, ex-
pressly claiming that it was based on "principles long recognized...
Id. at 442.
In his dissent, Justice White said:
That the Court's holding today is neither compelled nor even
strongly suggested by the language of the Fifth Amendment, is at
odds with American and English legal history, and involves a depar-
ture from a long line of precedent does not prove either that the
Court has exceeded its powers or that the Court is wrong or unwise
in its present reinterpretation of the Fifth Amendment. It does,
however, underscore the obvious-that the Court has not discov-
ered or found the law in making today's decision, nor has it derived
it from some irrefutable sources; what it has done is to make new
law and new public policy in much the same way that it has in the
course of interpreting other great clauses of the Constitution. This is
what the Court historically has done. Indeed, it is what it must
do ... until and unless there is some fundamental change in the
constitutional distribution of governmental powers.
Id. at 531. Justice White is quite right. As noted earlier, the justices
must make law. The words of the law are often highly ambiguous, es-
pecially the great power clauses such as the Equal Protection, Due
Process, Unreasonable Searches, Privileges and Immunities, and the
Religion and Speech Clauses. The justices must paint in the blank can-
vas. They create, they must create, the final picture. As Justice White
says so honestly, "it is what [they] must do." Id. at 531.
Therefore, why not honestly admit this and proceed to fill in the
empty spaces of the canvas on the basis of a forthright consideration
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of the merits of the matter, rather than to claim the "discovery" of a
legalistic answer?
The fiction of the "discovery" of the law-which the justices
often declare they must obey-relieves the justices of personal re-
sponsibility. The fiction is that it is "the law," not the justices, that
demands obedience. This is most helpful in hard cases that impose
painful consequences on people.
But the reality of the process is not acknowledged.
A famous judge once said in an informal talk to law students: "I
decide what I think is right, and then I look for the law to support it."
Judge Skelly Wright, Informal Speech at Hastings College of the Law
(date unknown) (author present at speech).
That is truth in judging! It is a truth which most justices refuse to
face, preferring instead to "discover" the answers to our nation's most
difficult problems by the use of legalistic advocacy and argumentation
in pressing for the result the justices often know ahead they will find
at the end of their search.
Honesty is indeed the best policy and it is time we, and the jus-
tices, face up to it.
Consistency
If we are willing to accept that judicial opinions are a form of
lawmaking, having the actual effect of lawmaking by a superlegislative
body, then let us compare the established rules for legislating with the
practices of the Court.
It is highly significant that there are few recognized standards on
the form and structure of judicial opinions.
Opinions are a matter of personal style. Some-all too few-are
brief and clear. Others reflect creative literary efforts. Purple
passages, flights of fancy, even aesthetic poetry and intentional humor
(amusing to all but the loser) are to be found.
Personalized choice of words is a common practice and it is par-
ticularly objectionable when synonyms are used to replace terms of
art.
Reed Dickerson, one of the leading authorities on the drafting of
laws, has said:
The cardinal rule of all drafting, sometimes called "the draftsman's
golden rule," can be stated in four words: Use your terms consist-
ently. For one thing, don't vary your terminology when referring to
the same thing. For example, don't refer to an automobile as an
"automobile" in one place and as a "motor car" in another. That's
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what Fowler calls "elegant variation." And don't do the converse.
Don't use the same term to refer to different things. For example,
don't use the term "military" to mean just the land forces in one
section and then use the same term to include the naval forces in
another section. Consistency is a sine qua non of all effective
communication.
Reed Dickerson, How to Make a Law, Address Before the Legislation
Institute (March 30, 1955), in 31 Notre Dame L. Rev. 14, 24 (1955).
Similarly, Judge Herbert F. Goodrich once observed:
I suppose one great weakness which lawyers and judges are ad-
dicted to is the lack of care in the use of words .... We use a word
meaning one thing in one place and use the same word meaning a
different thing in another place. In the first place, we get confused in
our words and ideas. It is the habit of judges to express their own
legal conclusions in their own way, and the first thing you will find
the same legal conclusions being expressed in half a dozen different
ways in the same opinion of the same court-the same opinion ex-
pressed half a dozen different ways by half a dozen different judges.
One of our dangers is and was very definitely a carelessness or
noncommon use in connection with languages ....
Judge Herbert F. Goodrich, Restatement, Address Before the Ne-
braska State Bar Association (December 28, 1945), in 25 Neb. L. Rev.
159, 164 (1945).
Recently a judgment of the Court contained this passage:
[W]hen "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the
same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental in-
terest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental lim-
itations on First Amendment freedoms. To characterize the quality
of the governmental interest which must appear, the Court has em-
ployed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling; substantial; subor-
dinating; paramount; cogent; strong. Whatever imprecision inheres
in these terms, we think it clear that a government regulation is suf-
ficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Gov-
ernment; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the further-
ance of that interest.
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, (1991) (quoting United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968)). In the Barnes and O'Brien
cases, the justices have not only pointed out the "variety of terms" but
they have added a new one-"important."
If "the draftsman's golden rule" is a cardinal rule for the legisla-
ture in making law, should it not be observed in lawmaking by the
Justices? By using one word or phrase consistently, the Justices would
a-'.oid the time and expense involved in litigating the precise meaning
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of the new words used in substitution. The common sense of the
"golden rule" of consistency seems obvious.
Footnotes
John Marshall did not use a single footnote in Marbury. He used
none in McCulloch v. Maryland. His colleague, Justice Story, followed
suit in famous cases.
Footnotes have been a public nuisance of long standing. For the
professional and daily reader of Supreme Court opinions, the constant
bobbing of the head up and down can lead to irreversible whiplash.
Obviously, we can do without footnotes. Their ubiquity is an ex-
ample of confusing the familiar with the necessary, as de Tocqueville
would say. How did we get them?
One explanation is that they are a byproduct of the Langdellian
theory that law is a science and that each assertion in legal writing
must be supported by authority. This is not the occasion to respond-
except with polite laughter-to the idea that law is a science. Law is
really a play on words.
Of course, the principles of stare decisis and precedent support
the reference to authority. However, the reference need not be at the
bottom of the page. It can be set forth in the text as this poor example
of legal writing shows.
However, many footnotes contain substantive comments, often
lengthy. One may excuse the pure citation of cases and sources but the
substantive footnote is unacceptable. If the substance of the footnote
is relevant and worth a dip of the head, it should be woven into the
text.
Conclusion
Supreme Court opinions, in their present style and substance, un-
necessarily add to the innate obscurity of the law.
Lawyers who must advise clients by predicting future Supreme
Court decisions on new cases are forced to play a guessing game, often
based more on the perceived values of individual justices than on the
relevant Supreme Court opinions.
Even the members of the Court, at times, disagree about their
own holdings in earlier cases. Justice Blackmun, in one dissenting
opinion, declared that the majority opinion "emasculates" a test that
Blackmun, himself, had written in his majority opinion in the Corn-
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plete Auto Transit case. Commonwealth Edison v. Montana, 453 U.S.
609, 645 (1981).
The practice of law is largely based on the ambiguity of words. As
Madison noted, much of this is unavoidable. Words are ambiguous.
But much of it is avoidable.
The needed reforms include:
1. the use of simple, plain words, rather than legalese;
2. brief opinions;
3. the inclusion of citations and substantive, relevant foot-
notes in the text;
4. consistency and precision in the use of words;
5. the statement of the law of the case at the opening of the
opinion, similar to a statute;
6. the production of a consensus opinion, whenever possible,
without numerous additional opinions.
Legal writing, in general, suffers from the same defects as those
identified in Supreme Court opinions. By serving as a model of im-
proved legal communication, the Justices of the Supreme Court, the
masters of the words, are the logical leaders of reform.
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